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The Paradox of the Fifth Principle of Pancasila: Analyzing the Impact of Poverty and the Gini Coefficient on Corruption Trends in Indonesia

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Abstract. *This research aims to analyze the impact of poverty levels and the Gini coefficient on the number of corruption cases in Indonesia during the period of 2004–2026 and to examine its relationship with social justice based on the perspective of the fifth principle of Pancasila. The research method used is quantitative with a causal-comparative design and time series data. Analysis is conducted using multiple linear regression with the Ordinary Least Squares method, beginning with classical assumption testing, followed by simultaneous testing, partial testing, and determination of the coefficient of determination. The research results show that poverty levels and the Gini coefficient significantly influence the number of corruption cases simultaneously, explaining 56.71 percent of the variation. Separately, poverty levels have a negative and significant effect on the number of corruption cases, while the Gini coefficient does not show a significant effect. These findings indicate that changes in socio-economic conditions cannot be simply understood as determinants of changes in the number of cases Corruption. The relationship between poverty, income distribution, and corruption may also be influenced by institutional conditions, as well as the capacity for detection and law enforcement, which are not included in the research model. The findings indicate that the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and corruption is complex in the context of social justice in Indonesia.*

Keywords:

Poverty; Gini Coefficient; Corruption

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
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Introduction

Corruption is a very important issue because it not only harms the country's finances but also hinders development and violates social justice in Indonesia. Considering the position of Pancasila as the nation's worldview, the application of its

values becomes crucial. As explained in the literature,(Tamba et al., 2024) state that Pancasila is the foundation in formulating social policies to achieve welfare and social justice. Moreover, (Saingo, 2021) describe that the implementation of Pancasila values plays an important role in efforts to prevent corruption in Indonesia. Therefore, corrupt actions are essentially violations of the law that contradict the principles of social justice in society.

The challenge of achieving social justice is reflected in the persistence of issues such as poverty and income inequality. Although the BPS data from March 2025 shows an improvement with a poverty rate of 8.47% (23.85 million people) and a Gini index of 0.375, the improvement in these macroeconomic indicators does not guarantee an equitable distribution of welfare. In this regard, (Imantria, 2024), through its research in 34 provinces of Indonesia between 2015 and 2022, found that the Gini coefficient has a positive and significant impact on poverty. This indicates that as income inequality widens, the burden of poverty faced by society will increase.



Sumber: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)

Figure 1. Development of the Percentage of Poor Population and Gini Ratio in Indonesia

It is important to analyze in depth the relationship between poverty, inequality, and corruption, as corruption can significantly reduce the effectiveness of public services and development budgets. In this context,(Nawatmi et al., 2024) use data from Indonesia for the period 2007–2022 to demonstrate a connection between corruption and poverty, where worsening corruption conditions, reflected in a declining CPI, are associated with an increase in poverty. Additionally, (Karimi et al., 2023) found that the Corruption Perception Index and poverty have a significant impact on income inequality in Indonesia, based on data from the period 1997–2021. At the regional level, (Benedictus Maria et al., 2025) conducted research in six ASEAN countries.

At the regional level, Benedictus Maria et al. (2025) analyzed panel data from six ASEAN countries over 2013–2022 and found that income inequality and corruption significantly affect each other: high inequality increases the risk of corruption, while corruption worsens income distribution. Similarly, Khan (2021), using balanced panel data for 23 emerging countries from 1996 to 2017, found that the relationship between inequality and corruption is non-linear, taking a U-shaped form in high-income emerging countries and an inverted U-shaped form in upper-middle-income ones, with causality running in one direction between the two.

However, several gaps remain. First, most studies measure corruption through perception-based indices such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Nawatmi et al., 2024; Karimi et al., 2023), which capture public or expert opinion rather than the actual corruption cases disclosed and prosecuted by law enforcement institutions. These two types of measures are not interchangeable, because the number of

prosecuted cases also reflects the detection capacity and performance of institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Second, the existing Indonesian studies mostly place poverty or inequality as the *outcome* of corruption, while far fewer test whether socioeconomic conditions are associated with the number of corruption cases themselves over a long time series. Third, discussions of Pancasila and corruption (Saingo, 2021; Tamba et al., 2024) remain largely normative and conceptual, and rarely connect the Fifth Principle, social justice for all Indonesian people, to quantitative evidence. As a result, it is still unclear whether progress in poverty reduction and income distribution is actually accompanied by a lower number of corruption cases.

This question matters theoretically and practically. Rent-seeking theory (Krueger, 1974) suggests that expanding public budgets, including social assistance and development funds, enlarges the opportunities for bureaucratic actors to divert resources. The principal-agent model (Banerjee, 1997) suggests that stronger oversight reduces the information asymmetry between the public and officials, so more cases are exposed. Under both perspectives, a decline in poverty does not necessarily coincide with a decline in recorded corruption cases, and this is the paradox examined in this study. Practically, Indonesia has invested heavily in social programs and anti-corruption institutions, yet corruption remains a visible threat to the fair distribution of welfare (Hidayat et al., 2024). Evidence on how socioeconomic indicators relate to corruption cases is therefore needed to guide policies that are both pro-poor and resistant to rent-seeking.

Accordingly, this study aims to analyze the effect of the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient on the number of corruption cases in Indonesia during 2004–2026, both simultaneously and partially, and to interpret the results through the Fifth Principle of Pancasila. This study contributes in three ways: (1) it uses KPK case data as an enforcement-based indicator rather than perception indices; (2) it tests poverty and inequality together in a time-series framework, with stationarity and causality checks; and (3) it links the statistical findings to the ethical framework of social justice in Pancasila, offering policy implications for budget transparency and digital oversight.

Research Methods

This research adopts a quantitative approach with a causal-comparative research design. According to Kerlinger and Emzir in (Paramita et al., 2021), causal-comparative research, also known as ex post facto research, is an empirical investigation conducted systematically where the researcher does not directly control the independent variables, as these variables existed beforehand or because they inherently cannot be manipulated. This approach is chosen to test and analyze the influence of independent variables, which describe failures in social justice (income inequality and poverty levels), on the dependent variable (the number of corruption cases) in Indonesia. The analytical model used in this research is multiple linear regression analysis based on time-series data.The main purpose of regression analysis is to make predictions or forecasts and to understand the causal relationships between dependent and independent variables (Harsono et al., 2023). Each variable consists of Independent Variable X1, which measures Income Inequality (Gini Ratio), expressed in a decimal coefficient index on a scale ranging from 0 to 1. Independent Variable X2 is the Poverty Rate expressed as a percentage (%), and this data is published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) of the Republic of Indonesia. The Dependent Variable Y is the Number of Corruption Cases, expressed in case units and obtained from the official website of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) of the Republic of Indonesia. The linear relationship

between these variables is estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.Considering that the scales of the units among variables have been linearly adjusted in the form of pure decimals and absolute numbers in similar cases, the multiple linear regression equation model in this study is formulated as follows:

$$\mathbf{Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \varepsilon_t}$$

Explanation:

Y = Number of Corruption Cases
X_1 = National Gini Ratio
X_2 = Poverty Rate
β_0 = Constant
β_1, β_2 = Multiple Linear Regression Coefficients
ε_t = Error term / Residual in year t

Before interpreting the model, classical assumption testing must be conducted to ensure that the regression model meets the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) criteria. Normality testing, heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation are important steps in classical assumption testing to ensure the validity and reliability of the regression results (Kumar, 2023).To anchor the analysis in robust economic principles and avoid the risk of spurious regression common in time-series data, the model is grounded within the framework of institutional economics and the principal-agent model. Furthermore, the empirical validation is strengthened by conducting formal time-series property examinations, specifically the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test to ensure stationarity and the Pairwise Granger Causality Test to detect potential endogeneity or simultaneous causality loops between the macroeconomic variables.

Results and Discussion

This section presents the empirical findings obtained from multiple linear regression estimates using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to test hypotheses regarding the effects of the poverty rate (X_1) and income inequality, or the Gini ratio (X_2), on trends in the number of corruption cases (Y) in Indonesia from 2004 to 2026.

1. Results of the Classical Assumption Tests (Model Feasibility)

a. Normality Test: The Jarque–Bera probability value obtained was 0.165259. This value is greater than the significance level of alpha = 0.05, indicating that the regression model residuals are normally distributed.
b. Autocorrelation Test: The chi-square probability value for the autocorrelation test was 0.1846. Since this value is above 0.05, it can be concluded that there is no serial autocorrelation problem in the time-series data used.
c. Heteroscedasticity Test: The chi-square probability value in the heteroscedasticity test was 0.1230. This value, being greater than 0.05, indicates that the residual variance is constant, or homoscedastic.
d. Multicollinearity Test: The Centered Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for the independent variables were both 1.192475. This VIF value is well below the critical threshold of 10.0, confirming that there is no indication of multicollinearity among the independent variables in the model.

Beyond the classical assumption tests, the diagnostic time-series properties demonstrate that while all variables are non-stationary at level, they consistently become stationary at the first difference order, or I(1), under the ADF test with probability values well below the 5% significance threshold (Prob D(Y) = 0.0301; D(X_1) = 0.0198; D(X_2) = 0.0024). Additionally, the Pairwise Granger Causality Test with 2 lags confirms the absence of dynamic bidirectional relationships between Corruption (Y) and Poverty (X_2), yielding non-significant probability values of 0.5375 and 0.5349,

respectively. This statistically verifies that the OLS model is robust and completely free from simultaneity bias.
Based on statistical data analysis using the OLS method, the parameter coefficients for the multiple linear regression equation were obtained as follows:

$$\mathbf{Y_t = 347.7449 - 14.2201X_1\ t - 260.5606X_2\ t + \varepsilon_t.}$$

From this equation, the constant value is 347.7449. The regression coefficient for the Poverty Level variable (X1) is -14.2201, while the coefficient for the Ini Ratio variable (X2) is -260.5606.

2. Simultaneous Hypothesis Test (F-Test)
F-Test (Simultaneous): The model produces an F-statistic value of 13.09961, with a Prob(F-statistic) value of 0.000231. The probability value, which is far below alpha = 0.05, indicates that the Poverty Level (X1) and Ini Ratio (X2) variables jointly have a significant effect on the Number of Corruption Cases (Y). Coefficient of Determination (R^2): The R-squared value obtained is 0.567092. This figure indicates that 56.71% of the variation in the Number of Corruption Cases can be jointly explained by the Poverty (X1) and Ini Ratio (X2) variables; meanwhile, the remaining 43.29% is explained by other variables outside this research model.

3. Partial Hypothesis Testing (t-Test)
Partial Effect of the Poverty Rate (X1): The t-statistic for the Poverty Rate variable is -4.886571, with a probability value of 0.0001. This probability value, which is lower than alpha = 0.05, indicates that, partially, the Poverty Rate (X1) has a significant effect on the Number of Corruption Cases (Y) in Indonesia, although the coefficient is negative ($beta_1$ = -14.22010). Partial Effect of the Gini Ratio (X2): The t-statistic for the Gini Ratio variable is -0.568193, with a probability value of 0.5762. This probability value is higher than alpha = 0.05, indicating that, partially, the Gini Ratio (X_2) does not have a significant effect on the Number of Corruption Cases (Y) in Indonesia.

Tabel 1. Results of Regression Tests and OLS Regression Tests

Variabel	**Coefficient**	**Std.Error**	**t-Statistic**	**Prob**
C	347.7449	192.2362	1.808946	0.0855
GINI RATIO X1	-260.5606	458.5776	-0.568193	0.5762
POVERTY X2	-14.22010	2.910036	-4.886571	0.0001
R-squared	0.567092	Durbin-Watson stat		0.949523
F-statistic	13.09961	Prob(F-statistic)		0.000231

Normalitas	Prob (Jarque-Bera)	0.165259	
Autokolerasi	Prob.chi Square	0.1846	
HeteroskedastisitasProb.chi Square		0.1230	
Multikolineartity	Centered VIF	1.192475(X_1) 1.192475 (X_2)	
Unit Root Test (ADF)	D(Y) [Corruption]	-3.265044	0.0301
	D(X_1) [Gini Ratio]	-4.442947	0.0024
	D(X_2) [Poverty]	-3.467822	0.0198
Granger Causality Test	X1-Y	0.65076	0.5349
	X2-Y	0.64554	0.5375

Source: EViews 13 Data Processing Output (2026)

The simultaneous estimation results (F-test) show a probability value of 0.000231 with $p<0.05$, empirically supporting the conceptual framework that the dynamics of corruption cases (Y) in Indonesia are closely related to conditions reflecting the failure to implement social justice (Page et al., 2026), as represented by the Poverty (X1) and Gini Ratio (X2) variables. Together, these two macroeconomic indicators account for 56.71% of the variation in law enforcement by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). However, the partial test (t-test) produced findings that challenge the prevailing trend in earlier literature. The statistical insignificance of the Gini coefficient implies that income distribution dynamics do not directly dictate short-term enforcement trends. Economically, this can be attributed to several factors: first, the national Gini ratio exhibits limited statistical variation during the study period (fluctuating strictly between 0.35 and 0.41), restricting the OLS model's identification capacity. Second, inequality may interact with institutional subversion through non-linear or threshold effects rather than standard linear specifications. Lastly, aggregated national indicators tend to mask regional heterogeneity and the structural reality of grand corruption in Indonesia, which operates within elite procurement networks and political power imbalances rather than responding to marginal shifts in the public income distribution index. Conversely, there is a striking theoretical anomaly in the Poverty Rate variable (X1), which shows a significant effect ($p = 0.0001$) but has a negative coefficient direction (β_1=-14,22010). This finding formally contradicts the traditional linear assumption that increasing poverty always corresponds with increasing corruption (Pîrvan & Nișulescu, 2022). Within the KPK enforcement data from 2004–2026, success in reducing Indonesia's macro-level poverty rate has instead occurred alongside an increase in the intensity of corruption case disclosures.

To enhance the academic rigour of this finding and address the critical limitations of behavioral models, this phenomenon can be comprehensively decoded through the lens of institutional economics, specifically the Rent-Seeking Theory (Krueger, 1974) and the Principal-Agent Model (Banerjee, 1997). Within this macroeconomic framework, the significant negative coefficient of the poverty rate ($\beta_1 = -14.22010$) does not imply a societal paradox, but rather a classic identification problem in econometrics. The dependent variable employed in this model—the absolute number of corruption cases prosecuted by the KPK—strictly captures the enforcement supply side of the legal system, rather than the hidden, absolute demand or volume of corruption in society. Indonesia's successful macroeconomic trajectory in reducing poverty over the 2004–2026 period was heavily driven by the strategic expansion of social assistance programs, economic safety nets, subsidies, and regional infrastructure funds. From the perspective of Rent-Seeking Theory, this massive influx of public capital structurally expanded the 'budget pie,' generating heightened incentives for opportunistic bureaucratic actors to engage in rent-seeking irregularities and budgetary diversions.

Concurrently, under the Principal-Agent framework, as the state modernizes and invests in anti-corruption infrastructure, the informational asymmetry between the public (Principal) and government officials (Agent) narrows. The institutional enhancement of the KPK, combined with advanced auditing and digital public reporting mechanisms, significantly increases the state's detection and enforcement capabilities. Consequently, the downward trend in macro-poverty occurs simultaneously with an increase in the disclosure rate of public fund mismanagement. This structural reality aligns with the ethical imperative of the Fifth Principle of Pancasila, warning policymakers that quantitative poverty reduction must be strictly balanced with rigorous institutional oversight to prevent welfare instruments from mutating into new arenas of economic rent-seeking.

A comprehensive synthesis can be made of the in-depth evaluation of the theoretical anomaly involving the negative effect of the poverty rate and the insignificance of the Gini Ratio. The statistical transmission pathway, combined with a deconstruction of GONE Theory, is systematically presented in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Synthesis Diagram of Statistical Test Results and the Deconstruction of GONE Theory in Explaining the Poverty–Corruption Paradox

Theoretically, this study makes a novel contribution to the field of political economy by shifting away from a deterministic perspective. Macroeconomic indicators such as poverty have been shown to function not only as "passive victims" or consequences of corrupt behavior, but also as dynamic stimuli that influence the intensity of law enforcement within a transitioning democratic ecosystem. Practically, the findings provide a clear warning to policymakers. Future social policies aimed at reducing poverty should not focus solely on achieving quantitative macro-level indicators. Success in reducing poverty accompanied by an increase in corruption cases indicates that the efficient use of the national budget has not yet been optimized. The government needs to strengthen internal control systems within the bureaucracy and institutional accountability from the budget-planning stage onward, ensuring that welfare instruments do not become new venues for rent-seeking practices (Hidayat et al., 2024). The researchers objectively acknowledge the methodological limitations of this study. The dependent variable (Y) relies entirely on absolute data concerning the "Number of Corruption Cases" officially prosecuted by the KPK. This figure clearly reflects the visible capacity and exposure of law enforcement, but it still cannot encompass the full spectrum of hidden structural misconduct that remains undetected (dark numbers/underground corruption). In addition, the availability of consistent time-series data is limited to the period from 2004 to 2026 because of historical constraints related to the establishment of the KPK after the Reform Era. Consequently, this model cannot yet capture changes in macro-level corruption behavior across longer periods and different leadership eras, such as the New Order period. Given the limitations identified, future research should conduct sector-specific analyses. Because the Gini Ratio variable was not significant in the aggregated national model, future researchers should adopt disaggregated regional or provincial panel data to better capture localized distribution dynamics(Grajzl & Murrell, 2024).

This study successfully revealed the reality of the Fifth Principle of Pancasila Paradox in national development. Ethically, it is deeply concerning that while the noble values of Pancasila call for the achievement of social justice for all citizens through welfare programs, budgetary resources that should be allocated to the rights of vulnerable groups are instead often tainted by moral hazard associated with rent-seeking by bureaucratic actors. The social consequences of this finding necessitate structural change through the comprehensive adoption of digital technology. The use of digital technologies such as artificial intelligence–based auditing systems (AI-controlled audits), the full digitization of social assistance distribution (cashless transfers), and the integration of electronic procurement systems (e-procurement) have become an urgent ethical imperative (Madan et al., 2025). Digitalization within the bureaucracy serves not only as a tool for improving administrative efficiency but also as an ethical means of eliminating direct interactions between bureaucrats and budgetary resources, addressing the dark space of Opportunity in GONE Theory, and restoring the rights associated with the equitable distribution of wealth to the public transparently in order to realize the Fifth Principle of Pancasila.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study reveals that the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and corruption in Indonesia cannot be understood solely on the assumption that improvements in public welfare will automatically reduce the number of corruption cases. Empirically, both the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient jointly have a significant effect on the number of corruption cases; however, when analyzed separately, only the poverty rate shows a significant negative effect, while the Gini coefficient shows no meaningful effect. These findings indicate that changes in the number of corruption cases during the study period were related not only to changes in income distribution but may also have been influenced by various institutional and social conditions not accounted for in the research model. In the context of the fifth principle of Pancasila, the findings affirm that improvements in socioeconomic indicators alone are insufficient to guarantee social justice without good governance. Therefore, poverty reduction should be viewed not only as an effort to improve public welfare but also as an element of strengthening governance to ensure that public resources are managed transparently and provide fair benefits to citizens. The empirical findings highlight the complexity of the Fifth Principle of Pancasila in national development. Quantitatively reducing macro-poverty indicators does not automatically secure comprehensive social justice if the expanded welfare budgets face rent-seeking vulnerabilities. Hence, institutional transparency, robust internal bureaucratic audits, and digital public oversight remain mandatory pre-requisites to ensure development capital directly serves public welfare without giving rise to new avenues of institutional corruption.

Based on the research findings, the government should strengthen poverty-reduction policies by increasing budget transparency, internal oversight, accountability in social assistance programs, and public complaint mechanisms. Stronger governance is needed to ensure that increased public funding for social programs does not create opportunities for budget abuse. The use of digital technology in the distribution of social assistance, public procurement, and auditing processes can also be expanded to improve transparency and the traceability of public expenditures. For future research, the measurement of corruption should be further developed by using a broader range of indicators rather than relying solely on the number of cases officially recorded or prosecuted, since the number of recorded cases may also be influenced by detection and law-enforcement capacity. Future studies could also use longer observation periods, sector- or region-based

approaches, and analytical methods capable of capturing nonlinear relationships and temporal interactions among poverty, income distribution, and corruption. Such developments could provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between socioeconomic conditions, governance, and efforts to achieve social justice.

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